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COMMENT
THE HONORABLE KARL
0

E.

MUNDTi-

N MARCH 26, 1962, the Supreme Court of the United States

handed down its historic decision in Baker v. Carr.' Subsequent decisions have further spelled out what has come to be known as the "one
man, one vote" principle.

As a result of Baker v. Carr and Wesberry v. Sanders,2 great
strides have been made over the last five years toward bringing state
legislative districts and United States congressional districts into line
with "one man, one vote" standards. In addition, these decisions focused
attention on other units of government where obvious inequities existed.
The Electoral College, operating under the general ticket or unit
rule ("winner take all") method, is, in my estimation, the most unfair,
inaccurate, uncertain, and undemocratic institution of all. It was natural,
therefore, that a suit challenging the constitutionality of such a system
was filed in October of 1966 before the Supreme Court of the United
States.' This was an original action by the State of Delaware, as
parens patriae for its citizens, against the State of New York, all other
states, and the District of Columbia. It was brought under authority of
article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution and section
1251 of the Judicial Code.4 The suit challenged the constitutionality
of the respective state statutes employing the "general ticket" or "state
unit-vote" system by which the total number of presidential electoral
votes of a state is arbitrarily misappropriated for the candidate receiving
a bare plurality of the total number of citizens' votes cast within the
state.
The Supreme Court refused to hear the case of Delaware v. New
York.5 This was unfortunate, because an obvious inequity exists. No
one will ever know why the Court declined to accept the case. There
could be a recognition, however, that the Electoral College system of
selecting our President does not lend itself to the same "one man, one
vote" type of attack that prevailed in the legislative field. Other factors,
the most important of which is the historical significance of the compromise between the large and small states that made the adoption

of the Constitution possible, enter into the consideration.
t

United States Senator from South Dakota.

1.369 U.S. 186 (1962).

2. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. Delaware v. New York, No. 28 Original (filed July 20, 1966).

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1966).
5. 385 University
U.S. 895 Charles
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

It is this same tendency to examine the supposed voting power
of an individual in a mathematical vacuum, divorced from all other
factors, that makes Mr. Banzhaf's article interesting but at the same
time irrelevant. While his conclusions may be mathematically correct
they are founded upon a mechanical computer and not the Constitution.
The supporters of the district plan for the election of the President
do not deny that under such a system the voters of the smaller states
would enjoy a somewhat greater voting power. Unless, however, we
are to completely disregard the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and rupture our federal system - the cornerstone of our democratic
government - by the adoption of a direct election system, this must
be so.
Under our present system, each state has a minimum of three
electoral votes, regardless of its size. Any system which preserves this
three-vote minimum and the federal principle involved will continue to
grant a slightly greater voting power to some states. Indeed, this was
the original purpose of the electoral vote bonus for smaller states, so
that the greater populations of the larger states could not dictate the
selection of the President. It was part of the compromise which made
the Constitution possible.
On the other hand, the so-called "unit-vote" system is not part of
our Constitution. It was unanticipated by the framers of that document
and simply grew out of political expediency. Its use has resulted in
disproportionate power for some states, and the voters in them, as
Mr. Banzhaf's article points out, and should, in my estimation, be
abolished in favor of the district plan.
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